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OIL AND GAS-CONSERVATION-FEDERAL V. STATE REGULATION*-Sec -
tion 717(a) of the Natural Gas Act 1 states:
[T]he business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate
distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and . . .
Federal regulation in matters relating to the transportation of na-
tural gas and the sale thereof in interstate commerce is necessary
in the public interest.2
Section 717 (b) provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce
of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domes-
tic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas com-
panies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to
any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the facilities
used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of na-
tural gas.
3
These sections constitute federal preemption of the power to control the
delivered price of natural gas to the consumer. When interstate commerce
is involved in the transportation and sale of natural gas, the states are blocked
from regulating sales by the "commerce" clause of the United States Con-
stitution. 4 Congress intended that federal regulation should be imposed upon
the interstate transportation of natural gas and those sales which the states
did not have power to regulate. 5 However, the United States Supreme Court
* Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
1. 52 Stat. 821 (1938) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
2. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1958).
3. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §717(b) (1958).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have the power . . . (3) To regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
The validity of state regulation of wholesale rates of natural gas was tested in
State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934), and Missouri v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924). The United State Supreme Court held, on the
basis of Wabash S. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), that the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution is a limitation upon the authority of the sev-
eral states, and state action which operates as a direct burden upon, or obstruction
to, interstate commerce is unlawful even in the absence of federal regulation over the
subject matter.
5. S. Doc. No. 92, pt. 84-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928), report of Federal Trade
Commission on natural gas companies and natural gas pipeline industry, submitted
on December 31, 1935; H.R. Rep. No. 2651, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), report of
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on proposed Natural Gas Act (H.R.
12680) with recommendation that it pass.
One of the clearest statements of the purposes of Congress in passing the Natural
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has said that the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission8 does not
interfere with the power of the states to regulate production and promote con-
servation practices.7 The last phrase of section 717(b) of the Natural Gas
Act s exempts "production or gathering of natural gas" from the provisions
of the Act. The practice has been to allow the states to regulate production in
pursuit of their conservation statutes, but within the limits of the "produc-
tion and gathering" exemption. If the states' regulations exceed these limits,
the Federal Power Commission will preempt jurisdiction on the ground that
the states' activities have an effect on the sale or transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce. As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
In a line of decisions beginning with Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 598, and Interstate
Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 689-693
it has been consistently held that "production" and "gathering" are
terms narrowly confined to the physical acts of drawing the gas from
the earth and preparing it for the first stages of distribution.9
Gas Act was made by Mr. Justice Rutledge in Panhandle -E. Pipe Line Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of Indiana, 332 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1947):
The act, though extending federal regulations, had no purpose or effect to
cut down state power. On the contrary, perhaps its primary purpose was to
aid in making state regulation effective, by adding the weight of federal reg-
ulation to supplement and reinforce it in the gap created by the prior de-
cisions. The Act was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise
of state power, not to handicap or dilute it in any way ...
The Natural Gas Act created an articulate legislative program based on
a clear recognition of the respective responsibilities of the federal and state
regulatory agencies. It does not contemplate ineffective regulation at either
level. We have emphasized repeatedly that Congress meant to create a com-
prehensive and effective regulatory scheme, complementary in its operation to
those of the states and in no manner usurping their authority. . . . The scheme
was one of cooperative action between federal and state agencies.
For additional general information on federal regulation see Atkinson, Federal
Regulation of Natural Gas-The Independent Producers' Status, 13 Sw. L.J. 425
(1959) ; Sargent, Regulation of Natural Gas-Federal v. State, 27 Dicta 216 (1950) ;
Newcomb, Effects of Federal Regulation Under the Natural Gas Act Upon the Pro-
duction and Conservation of Natural Gas, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 217 (1945) ; Com-
ment, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 Geo. L.J. 695 (1956).
6. Enforcement of the provisions of the Natural Gas Act is vested in the Federal
Power Commission. The Commission has the power to perform any and all acts and
to prescribe such rules and regulations as it may find necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of the Act. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1958).
7. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1944) ; Panhandle E. Pipe
Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Indiana, 332 U.S. 507, 516-19 (1947) ; Interstate
Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947) ; FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line
Co., 337 U.S. 498, 502-04 (1949).
8. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
9. Northern Natural Gas. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 89-90
(1963).
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The "line of decisions" the Court mentioned reached about as far as it could
without entirely preempting state regulatory power when the Court held, in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,'° that the "production and gathering"
exemption did not preclude federal regulation of natural gas sales by inde-
pendent producers and gatherers-whether the producers themselves were en-
gaged in the interstate sale and transportation of natural gas or merely sold
their product to an interstate pipeline." Phillips made it extremely difficult
for a state to impose regulations on natural gas producers within the state.
Whether or not the regulation was conservation-oriented, if it affected the
interstate distribution of natural gas it would be subject to federal pre-
emption.
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas,12 the su-
preme court extended federal preemption over state conservation regulation in
another manner. Here, the question raised was whether a state might law-
fully impose a ratable take statute against the purchaser of natural gas (an
interstate pipeline company) as a means of insuring a ratable take of total
field allowables of gas in order to keep the field in balance, prevent waste
and protect correlative rights. This decision, invalidating Kansas' ratable take
statute,13 will similarly affect ratable take statutes in other oil-producing
states, including New Mexico.'
4
10. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
11. Some exerpts from the majority's opinion will illustrate the all-inclusive nature
of the Phillips holding:
[W]e believe that the legislative history indicates a congressional intent to
give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural
gas in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not and whether
occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate pipeline com-
pany.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954).
[W]e are satisfied that congress sought to regulate wholesales of natural gas
occurring at both ends of the interstate transmission systems.
Id. at 683-84.
Regulation of the sales in interstate commerce for resale made by a so-called
independent natural-gas producer is not essentially different from regulation
of such sales when made by an affiliate of an interstate pipeline company.
Id. at 685.
12. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
13. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-703 (Supp. 1959) provides for ratable taking:
The commission shall so regulate the taking of natural gas from any and
all such common sources of supply within this state as to prevent the in-
equitable or unfair taking from such common source of supply by any person,
firm or corporation and to prevent unreasonable discrimination in favor of
any one common source of supply as against another and in favor of or
against any producer in any such common source of supply.
14. New Mexico has common purchaser and ratable take statutes:
Any person now or hereafter engaged in purchasing from one [1] or
more producers gas produced from gas wells shall be a common purchaser
thereof within each common source of supply from which it purchases, and
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Northern Natural, an interstate pipeline company, purchased gas under
about 125 contracts from producers in the Kansas Hugoton Field. The oldest
of these contracts, with Republic Natural Gas Co., bound Northern Natural
to purchase the maximum production allowables from Republic's Kansas
wells. The subsequent purchase contracts with other producers bound North-
ern Natural to take only so much of its requirements as were not satisfied
by the quantities taken from Republic. For several years Northern Natural's
requirements were such that its purchases from all the producers were roughly
ratable, i.e., in like proportion to the legally fixed allowables' 5 for each of
the approximately 1,100 wells in the Kansas Hugoton Field. However, in
1958, after an intensive study, the Kansas Corporation Commission issued
a report and an order' 6 which dealt with the problem of drainage from the
Kansas portion of the Hugoton Field to Oklahoma and Texas portions of
the field. The report stated that the question presented for determination was
two-fold: (1) whether migration of gas was occurring or was likely to occur
from the Kansas portion of the Hugoton Gas Field to other portions of the
field and what remedial steps could and should be taken by the Kansas Cor-
poration Commission to prevent loss of natural gas to Kansas and Kansas
owners; and (2) what corrective measures could and should be taken by the
as such it shall purchase gas lawfully produced from gas wells with which
its gas transportation facilities are connected in the pool. . . . Such purchases
shall be made without unreasonable discrimination in favor of one I1] pro-
ducer against another in the price paid, the quantities purchased ....
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 63-3-15(d) (1953).
Any common purchaser taking gas produced from gas wells from a com-
mon source of supply shall take ratably under such rules, regulations and
orders, concerning quantity, as may be promulgated by the commission con-
sistent with.this act.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §65-3-15(e) (1953).
15. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-703 (Supp. 1959) provides:
Whenever the available production of natural gas from any common source
of supply is in excess of the market demands for such gas from such common
source of supply, or whenever the market demands for natural gas from any
common source of supply can be fulfilled only by the production of natural
gas therefrom under conditions constituting waste as herein defined [see Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-702 (1949)], or whenever the commission finds and de-
termines that the orderly development of, and production of natural gas from,
any common source of supply requires the exercise of its jurisdiction, then
any person, firm or corporation having the right to produce natural gas there-
from, may produce only such portion of all the natural gas that may be cur-
rently produced without waste and to satisfy the market demands, as will
permit each developed lease to ultimately produce approximately the amount
of gas underlying such developed lease and currently produce proportionately
with other developed leases in said common source of supply without un-
compensated cognizable drainage between separately-owned, developed leases
or parts thereof. . ..
16. Docket No. 51,488-C (C-4916) (Kan. Corp. Comm'n 1958).
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Commission in performance of its statutory duty to prevent waste, protect
correlative rights and prevent unreasonable discrimination and inequitable
withdrawals of gas from the field. The order contained within the report
revised the formula for determining field allowables and, when applied to the
Kansas portion of the Hugoton Field, increased the proportionate allowable
for each producing well in the field. A balance was thus reestablished be-
tween Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. Northern Natural's market require-
ments did not increase accordingly. The balance of Northern Natural's total
requirements, after the contractually required purchases from Republic, re-
sulted in purchases from other producers of proportions substantially below
their maximum allowables. To correct this imbalance of taking and to pro-
tect the producers' correlative rights, the Kansas Corporation Commission,
by statutory authority, 17 ordered Northern Natural to take gas from Repub-
lic's wells in no higher proportion to the allowables than from the wells of
the other producers.' 8 This order, directed specifically at Northern Natural,
was rescinded by a later order directed generally at all purchasers within the
Commission's jurisdiction, including Northern Natural. 19 These orders pre-
sented Northern Natural with -two awkward alternatives: (1) honor its
contract with Republic, increase its takes from other producers' wells and
end up with more gas than it could use, or (2) decrease its take from Re-
public wells below allowables, in order to take ratably from all wells but not
purchase more gas than it needed, and run the risk of liability for breach
of the Republic contract because it did not purchase all of Republic's
allowables.
Northern Natural argued in the Kansas courts that the orders of the Kan-
sas Corporation Commission were invalid because they invaded the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. The Kansas trial court up-
held the Corporation Commission's orders and the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed. 20 On appeal the United States Supreme Court, held, Reversed and
Remanded. The orders were invalid because they were concerned with the
17. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-703 (Supp. 1959). See note 13 supra.
18. Docket No. 60,740-C (C-7216) (Kan. Corp. Comm'n 1959).
19. Docket No. 34,780-C (C-1825) (Kan. Corp. Comm'n 1960). The general order
of the Commission, embodied in Rule 82-2-219 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n 1960), provided:
In each common source of supply under proration by this Commission,
each purchaser shall take gas in proportion to the allowables from all the
wells to which it is connected and shall maintain all such wells in substan-
tially the same proportionate status as to overproduction or underproduction;
provided, however, this rule shall not apply when a difference in proportion-
ate status results from the inability of a well to produce proportionately with
other wells connected to the purchaser.
20. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 188 Kan. 355,
362 P.2d 599 (1961), rehearing denied, 188 Kan. 624, 364 P.2d 668 (1961).
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purchase of natural gas-not with the production and gathering of natural gas. 2 '
The majority pointed out that Kansas had the alternative means of check-
ing waste and disproportionate taking-by directing proration orders at pro-
21. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 92
(1963). The decision was rendered 5-3, Mr. Justice White not participating.
The majority of the Court considered, and rejected, three arguments of the Kansas
Corporation Commission. First, that the orders of the Commission constituted only
state regulation of "production and gathering" and were thus exempt from the pro-
visions of the Natural Gas Act. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)
(1958). Rejected: "production" and "gathering" are terms narrowly confined to the
physical acts of drawing gas from the earth and preparing it for the first stages of
distribution. 372 U.S. at 90. Northern Natural is a purchaser, not a producer, of nat-
ural gas. Second, the orders did not invade the federal domain, because they did not
involve the price of natural gas. Rejected: it does not matter whether, the state's
regulation interferes directly or indirectly with price; states are precluded from pro-
mulgating regulations that would affect interstate wholesales of natural gas. The Court
reasoned (1) that to impose a ratable take rule on an interstate purchaser would be
be to shift the burden of balancing the output of thousands of natural gas wells from
the state regulatory body to the purchaser; (2) that any readjustment of purchasing
patterns which such ratable take orders might require of purchasers might impair
the authority of the Federal Power Commission to regulate the intricate relationship
between the purchasers' cost structures and the eventual costs to wholesale customers
who sell to consumers in other states; and (3) that the Federal Power Commission has
exclusive authority in this relationship. 372 U.S. at 91-92. Third, ratable taking is
essential for conservation, and conservation is traditionally a function of the state.
Rejected: states have power to allocate and conserve natural gas only when the con-
servation measures are aimed at producers and production, not when such measures
are directed at interstate purchasers and wholesales of natural gas for resale. 372 U.S.
at 93-94.
Two arguments in Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion should be noted. First,
he argued that just because the Kansas orders read "purchaser" rather than "pro-
ducer", it did not conclusively mean the orders were an attempt to regulate the inter-
state sale of natural gas. The true purpose behind the order should have been con-
sidered rather than the mere wording of the order.
The production of natural gas and its movement into interstate channels con-
stitute one and the same physical operation. Thus the Kansas orders limiting
the volume of gas a pipeline may purchase from a given well are tantamount
to a limitation on the production of that well. Indeed an order directed to the
purchaser of the gas rather than to the producer would seem to be the most
feasible method of providing for ratable taking, because it is the purchaser
alone who has a first-hand knowledge as to whether his takes from each of
his connections in the field are such that production of the wells is ratable.
An order addressed simply to producers requiring each one to produce ratable
with others with whose activities it is unfamiliar and over whose activities
it has no control would create obvious administrative problems.
372 U.S. at 100-01 (dissenting opinion). (Footnotes omitted).
It is submitted that such "administrative problems" would not occur in New Mexico
because its conservation statutes contemplate that the Oil Conservation Commission
shall determine the allocation of allowable production, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-13(c)
(1953), and the ratable take of a common purchaser, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-15(e)
(1953).
The dissent's second argument criticized the all-inclusive nature of the statement
of the majority that it does not matter whether the states' regulations interfere directly
or indirectly with price; they are precluded from promulgating regulations that would
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ducers.2 2 In so directing the states' regulatory efforts, the Court still gives
validity to the "purchaser-producer" distinction. However, the Court will
invalidate ratable take orders directed at purchasers. New Mexico has com-
mon purchaser and ratable take statutes which are subject to federal invalida-
tion.2 3 Perhaps the argument could be made in favor of New Mexico's ratable
take statute. that it provides that the Oil Conservation Commission shall
promulgate the rate of taking and does not shift the burden of determination
to the purchaser.2 4 It is doubtful, however, that this would be a sufficient dis-
tinction to protect it from federal attack. The Supreme Court of the United
States would still find it invalid because it would regulate the purchaser, not
the producer.
In Northern Natural the decision to invalidate the Kansas ratable take
order was correct. To have held the order valid would have allowed eco-
nomic waste in attempting to protect the correlative rights of the Kansas pro-
ducers. The majority dismissed Northern Natural's argument that the ratable
take orders of the Kansas Corporation Commission were tainted by an im-
proper motive. 25 Whether the motive behind the Commission's orders was
pertinent to the decision of the case or not, the point is that the language of the
Kansas statute permitted the orders to be issued in the first place. Kansas con-
servation statutes include provisions against waste,2 6 but the definition of eco-
affect interstate wholesales of natural gas. As the dissent pointed out, it would not be
difficult to show that almost any regulation will have some effect on the final sale
price of natural gas-even those regulations which deal with the physical acts of
drawing the gas from the earth and preparing it for the first stages of distribution,
heretofore excepted from the jurisdiction of the Natural Gas Act. 372 U.S. at 103-04;
see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). State production
allowable orders could well be included under such a broad rule even though the
United States Supreme Court has previously upheld their validity in Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
22. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 94
(1963).
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-15(d), (e) (1953). See note 14 supra.
24. See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting arguments and the discussion by the ma-
jority, note 19 supra.
25. The majority stated:
There is no occasion to consider appellant's further argument that the
Kansas Commission's orders were tainted by an improper motive, that is, to
require over-production of Kansas Hugoton wells in order to prevent disad-
vantageous drainage to Texas and Oklahoma, which share the Hugoton Field
with Kansas. The relevancy of motive to the validity of such regulations
has been questioned . . . [Citation omitted]. See however . . . [Contra citation
omitted] where the Court invalidated a state proration order 'shown to bear no
reasonable relation either to the prevention of waste or the protection of cor-
relative rights.'
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 95 n. 12
(1963).
26. [T]he production of natural gas in the state of Kansas in such manner and
under such conditions and for such purposes as to constitute waste is hereby prohibited.
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-701 (1949).
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nomic waste is limited to a description of the acceptable end-uses for Kansas
gas.27 Overproduction as a result of increased allowables can still occur within
the statutory definition-just as long as the over-produced gas is put to an accept-
able end-use.
Under the facts of Northern Natural, an order such as the Kansas order
could not have been issued in New Mexico, even in the face of drainage to
a neighboring state.28 Economic waste through overproduction is intended to
be included in the category of prohibited waste in New Mexico. 29 In almost
thirty years, only two New Mexico Supreme Court cases30 have arisen under
the New Mexico Oil Conservation Act.8 ' In each case the supreme court
gave judicial effect to the pertinent statutory sections,8 2 and in each case the
27. Kansas defines economic waste as follows:
[Tlhe term 'waste' as herein used, in addition to its ordinary meaning,
shall include economic waste, underground waste and surface waste. Economic
waste as used in this act, shall mean the use of natural gas in any manner
or process except for efficient light, fuel, carbon black manufacturing and re-
pressuring, or for chemical or other processes by which such gas is efficiently
converted into a solid or liquid substance.
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-702 (1949).
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-2 (1953) prohibits waste:
The production or handling of crude petroleum oil or natural gas of any
type or in any form ... in such manner or under such conditions or in such
amounts as to constitute or result in waste is each hereby prohibited. [Empha-
sis supplied.]
29. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-3 (1953) provides:
As used in this act the term 'waste,' in addition to its ordinary meaning
shall include: * * * * *
(e) The production in this state of natural gas from any gas well or wells,
or from any gas pool, in excess of the reasonable market demand from such
source for natural gas of the type produced or in excess of the capacity of
gas transportation facilities for such type of natural gas.
30. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809
(1962) ; Sims v. Mechem, 382 P.2d 183 (N.M. 1963).
31. Laws 1935, ch. 72; now N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-2 to -16, -18 to -29, -31 (1953,
Supp. 1961).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§65-3-2, -3(e) (1953). See notes 28 and 29 supra.
In the Continental Oil case the New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
We find no statutory authority vested in the commission to require the pro-
duction of a greater percentage of the allowable, or to see to it that the gas
purchasers can more nearly meet market demand unless such results stem from
or are made necessary by the prevention of waste or the protection of cor-
relative rights. * 0 * 0 *
[E]ven after a pool is prorated, the market demand must be deter-
mined, since, if the allo'wable production from the pool exceeds market de-
mand, waste would result if the allowable is produced.
Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 320, 373 P.2d 809, 816
(1962). (Emphasis added.)
The facts of the Continental Oil case are not exactly the same as in Northern
Natural in that Continental Oil involved only a change in the proration of an estab-
lished gas pool allowable; there was no increase in field allowables, as there was in
[VOL. 3
supreme court held that the Oil Conservation Commission may not issue an
order affecting or superseding a prior order which has established production
units or set proration of allowables unless the new order contains a finding
that waste existed under the old order or that the new order would prevent
waste. It is arguable that this rule would allow the New Mexico Oil Con-
servation Commission to increase field allowables in a Northern Natural sit-
uation where gas was being drained to another state. But, referring again
to the New Mexico statutory sections defining overproduction as waste,33
the rule would not be applicable because no reasonable market demand for
the additional gas could be shown. Nor would New Mexico's oil conservation
laws permit the "non-ratable" situation which resulted in Kansas as a conse-
quence of the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Kansas ratable take order
in Northern Natural34
Even though the Court's decision in Northern Natural to invalidate Kan-
sas' ratable take statute was correct, the broad language of the majority of the
Court, that states will be precluded from promulgating any regulations that
directly or indirectly affect the price of gas sold interstate, threatens the con-
servation powers of the states. But there is reason to expect that the Northern
Natural rule will be limited in its future applications to similar fact situa-
tions. Because the states are in closer touch with the condition of their na-
tural resources it is not practical to encourage federal conservation regula-
tion. The Supreme Court, in deciding the Northern Natural and FPC v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.3 5 cases, has indicated a willingness to
expand the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission into conservation
areas, but the Court also has indicated a strong desire to leave conservation
regulation to the states.36
Northern Natural. Nevertheless, the language of the New Mexico Supreme Court is
still pertinent to this discussion.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-2, -3 (e) (1953). See notes 28 and 29 supra.
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 63-3-3 (1953) states:
As used in this act the term 'waste,' in addition to its ordinary meaning,
shall include:
(d) The non-ratable purchase or taking of crude petroleum oil in this
state. Such non-ratable taking and purchasing causes or results in waste as
defined in the subsections (a), (b), (c) of this section and causes waste by
violating section 12(a) of this act. [65-3-13].
Subsection (d) does not expressly include natural gas in its definition. But in view of
the references to subsections (a), (b), (c) and section 65-3-13, all of which were
amended to include or refer to natural gas [N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 168, § 2], it is sub-
mitted that the Legislature intended to include the non-ratable taking or purchasing
of natural gas in subsection (d), as well as crude oil.
35. 365 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1961). In Transcontinental the Court recognized that the
Federal Power Commission could and should take appropriate account of certain con-
servation factors in certification proceedings.
36. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Indiana, 332 U.S.
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As a result of the Northern Natural case and other federal pressure the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission a8 has recently begun a thorough factual
study of all member states' conservation statutes.8 9 When the study is com-
pleted, recommendations will be made to correct any 'deficiencies discovered.
It is expected the individual states will make many of the suggested revisions
in their own conservation statutes and thus alleviate the pressure for federal
regulation.
40
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507, 517-20 (1947) ; Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456,
467 (1943). And, as the Court stated in Northern Natural:
There is no doubt that the states do possess power to allocate and conserve
scarce natural resources upon and beneath their lands. We have recognized
such power with particular respect to natural gas.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 93 (1963).
37. See Oil and Gas Journal, April 8, 1963, p. 42, May 27, 1963, p. 47; The Oil
Daily, July 2, 1963, p. 1; United States Att'y Gen. Fifth Report Pursuant to Section 2
of the Joint Resolution of August 7, 1959, consenting to an Interstate Compact to Con-
serve Oil and Gas, at 27, 28 (May 15, 1963).
38. The Compact membership now includes thirty oil and gas producing states,
three associate states, and observers from the United States government and several
foreign oil producing countries. For a review of the Compact's organization and ac-
tivities see Conservation of Oil and Gas-A Legal History 279 (Sullivan ed. 1958).
39. See generally Oil and Gas Journal, March 18, 1963, p. 69, April 15, 1963, pp.
77, 83, June 17, 1963, p. 54, June 24, 1963, pp. 57, 70; Interstate Oil Compact Comm'n
Comments, June 1963.
40. In view of the federal government's intent to preempt the states' control of
purchasers of natural gas, as expressed in the Northern Natural case, the states will
have to achieve ratable taking by the enactment and enforcement of statutes for
ratable production, which statutes will necessarily be directed at producers rather than
purchasers.
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